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Russia's 1993 Constitution: Rule of Law
for Russia or Merely a Return
to Autocracy?
by CHRISTINA M. MCPHBRSON*
"The function of the state authority is to ensure that legal standards
are binding. In its ideal development the state must act only according
to the law and according to justice, and any act of the state authority
must have a basis in law. That is how I see the essence of the rule of
law."
-Mikhail Gorbachev1
"The doctrine of constitutionalism means that the rule of law gov-
erns a state. "2
I. Introduction
Under the 1993 Russian Constitution,' the president may dissolve
the State Duma under two circumstances: if the State Duma fails to
confirm the president's candidate for prime minister three times4 or if
the Duma expresses a no-confidence vote in the government twice
within three months.5 The president may also unilaterally pass laws in
the form of decrees.6 Conversely, the president of the Russian Feder-
ation can only be impeached for "high treason or other high crime,"
which is voted on and must be passed by a two-thirds majority in each
* J.D., U.C. Hastings College of the Law, 2000. University of California, Santa Bar-
bara, Bachelor of Arts in Law and Society, 1994.
1. The Rule of Law, 28 STAN. J. IN'L LAW 477, 481 (1992).
2. Elizabeth K. Cooper, Comment on "Transitional Constitutionalism: Politics and
Law in Russia Since 1993," 14 Wisc. INT'L L. J. 531, 531 (1996).
3. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoy Federatsii [Constitution of the Russian Federation], trans-
lated in 16 CONsTTruriONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF =fI WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz, eds. 1994) [hereinafter Russ. CONST.].
4. See Russ. CONST. art. 111(4). The Prime Minster is officially known as the Chair-
man of the Government of the Federation. See id.
5. See id. at art. 117(3).
6. See infra section MI. A.
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parliamentary chamber.7 In practice, this structure creates near-auto-
cratic power in the person of the president, and consequentially the
legislative body is left too weak to have any significant governmental
influence. In order to appreciate the significance of the powers that a
Russian leader may wield under Russia's current government, an un-
derstanding of the constitution's origin and construction is necessary.
Furthermore, a discussion about the Russian constitution's allocation
of governmental power must take place with a view towards its unique
Russian context, accounting for Russia's historical experience and cur-
rent social goals. It is only within this contextual framework that the
1993 Russian Constitution can be evaluated as developing the rule of
law in Russia or simply reinforcing the autocratic rule of the past.
When Boris Yeltsin's draft constitution was adopted by national
referendum in December 1993, the voter turnout was low and the
people had no meaningful choice-it was either Yeltsin's constitution
or none at all. The constitution presented to the Russian people in the
referendum was tailor-made for Yeltsin, retaining for him strong pres-
idential powers reminiscent of those exercised by Russian Tsars such
as Peter the Great who sought to Westernize Russia and gave himself
broad powers to institute reforms. The enumerated constitutional
powers of the parliament are diluted by the constant threat of dissolu-
tion by the president if the laws passed are unfavorable to the presi-
dent. The manner in which the constitution has been implemented by
the president and the Duma since 1993 illustrates that this has been
the case. In addition, the expansive power given to the person of the
president begs the question of what will happen in June of 2000 when
a new president must be elected.8
H. A New Constitution
In Spring, 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin presented a draft
of a new Russian Constitution.' Since the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991, the Russian Federation had continued to operate
under the 1978 Soviet Constitution, which had been amended over
300 times.10 The Russian Congress had been considering, without re-
7. See id. at art. 93(1)-(2).
8. See id at art. 81(3). No one may hold the term of president for more than two
terms. Yeltsin's second term began in 1996 when he was re-elected.
9. See Serge Schmemann, Voters in Russia Expect Results, But Not Answers, N.Y.
Trams, Apr. 25, 1993, at 3.
10. See Margaret Shapiro, Drafting a Constitution in the Kremlin: More Than 700 Rus-
sians Will Begin Meeting Today in Democratic Bid to Fashion a Document, WAsH. PosT,
June 5, 1993, at A15; Molly Warner Lien, Red Star Trek. Seeking a Role for Constitutional
Law in Soviet Disunion, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 41, 103 (1994).
sult, a draft introduced in 1990.11 Yeltsin published his version in
April, 1993.12 He proposed that each member of the Russian Federa-
tion13 send two representatives to a Constitutional Conference to dis-
cuss the draft.' 4 In July, the Constitutional Conference met and after
making over 200 amendments, approved Yeltsin's constitution.'
At the same time that Yeltsin was promoting his version of a new
Russian Constitution, the Russian Congress sped up consideration of
their version of the constitution, also publishing a draft. 6 Both the
Russian Congress and Yeltsin looked to the Russian voters to gain
approval of their versions of the constitution. 17 Yeltsin, in an attempt
to resolve the conflict, proposed the formation of a working group,
composed of members of both sides, to negotiate and present a uni-
fied draft in September.18 Unfortunately, the Congress at this time
was not amenable to compromise and instead planned to vote on a
law that would make impeachment of the president easier.' 9
Yeltsin responded on September 21 with a televised address stat-
ing that he was disbanding the Congress and Supreme Soviet,20 replac-
ing them with a bicameral parliament for which elections would be
held in December.2 The Russian government would not go quietly,
however, and voted that night to appoint Alexander Rutskoi22 as pres-
ident. A violent standoff resulted when the Congress refused to leave
the White House. In the end, although the Constitutional Court sided
with the Congress, it was eventually Yeltsin, with his military support,
who won the day.'
Yeltsin published a revised draft of his constitution on November
11. See Lee Kendall Metcalf, Presidential Power in the Russian Constitution, 6 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL'Y 125, 130 (1996).
12. See Schmemann, supra note 9.
13. Under the Russian Constitution, the Russian Federation consists of over 20 repub-
lics. See Russ. CONST. art. 65(1).
14. See Metcalf, supra note 11, at 130.
15. See id. at 132.
16. See id. at 131.
17. See id. at 132.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. The Congress of People's Deputies (Congress) was elected in Russia's first multi-
candidate election in March, 1990. See Thomas Remington, Politics in Russia, in CoMPAR-
ATIVE Por-cs TODAY: WORLD VIEw 381, 389 (Gabriel A. Almond & G. Bingham
Powell, Jr., eds., 6th ed. 1996). The smaller, more professional Supreme Soviet was com-
posed of members of Congress and was responsible to it. See id. at 390.
21. See Schmemann, supra note 9.
22. Alexander Rutskoi was Yeltsin's Vice President and sided with the Congress.
23. See Michael A. Hiltzik, Yeltsin Tries to Rally Support for Constitution Russia: Urg-
ing Voters to Approve His Proposa4 He Defends Draft Giving the President More Power,
L.A. Tnvms, Nov. 10, 1993, at 8.
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9, 1993 with new provisions increasing presidential power. 4 He de-
creed that a national referendum would be held in December to adopt
his draft of the constitution.' Fifty percent of the vote was necessary
for adoption of the constitution in the referendum, which merely
asked for a 'yes' or 'no' answer to the question of whether the voter
accepted the "Constitution of the Russian Federation."'26 In support
of the constitution, Yeltsin stated, "[w]e need a Constitution as the
core of a united and strong state. We need a constitution [sic] if we
want to see legality and order restored in the country. Finally, we
need a Constitution in order to pursue democratic transformations in
the country consistently and calmly."27 On December 12, the Consti-
tution was adopted by 60% of voters, a narrow margin.'
It is not surprising that voters approved Yeltsin's constitution.
They really had no other informed choice. Yeltsin had shut down his
opponents, literally, in the White House, and dismissed the govern-
ment.29 In a thinly veiled threat, Yeltsin suggested that if the new
constitution was not adopted, then the totalitarian power of the Sovi-
ets could be restored.30 Yeltsin acknowledged that there existed bet-
ter means to adopt a constitution, but stated that the constitution
needed to be adopted so that the new Federal Assembly-to be
elected at the same time as the constitutional referendum-would
have jurisdiction.31 Yeltsin reinforced his argument by reminding his
opponents that the Federal Assembly would need time to become op-
erational and that the Federal Assembly could not risk further delay
in adoption of a constitution.32
Using this propaganda built from exaggerated risk, Yeltsin per-
suaded the Russian people to vote hastily, allowing Yeltsin to circum-
24. See id.
25. See iL
26. See Boris Yeltsin, On Holding a Nationwide Vote on the Draft of the Constitution of
the Russian Federation, reprinted in CumRnrr DIG. SOVIET PRESs, Nov. 17, 1993, at 7.
27. Michelle Lynn McClure, An Analysis of the New Russian Constitution, 4 J. Iwr'L L.
& PRAc. 601, 602 (1995).
28. See Lev Bruni and Pyotr Zhuravlyov, Elections: A New Duma, A New Constitu-
tion, but the Old President, reprinted in CuRRENT DIG. Sovir PRnss, Jan. 12, 1994, at 2.
The low voter turnout of 53.2% of all eligible voters was attributed to bad weather and
procedural complexities. See id.
29. In their attempt to depose Yeltsin, the legislature barricaded itself in the white
House (officially known as the House of Soviets) and elected Alexander Rutskoi as presi-
dent. See Serge Schmemann, Official Warning by Yeltsin Fails to Dislodge Legislators, N.Y.
Tnms, Sept. 30, 1993, at A14. Yeltsin, in response, barricaded the legislators in the build-
ing with a ring of military troops, heavy trucks, wire, and barricades. See id. Yeltsin also
cut off the building's phones, hot water, and electricity. See id.
30. See Russ. PRss DIG., Boris Yeltsin: As Presiden4 Iam Interested in Social Stability
More than Anyone Else, Nov. 16, 1993 at 1.
31. See icL
32. See ild.
vent any parliamentary influence. Yeltsin argued, against allowing
Parliament to draft its own constitution, simply stating that "[a] docu-
ment of this caliber can be discussed endlessly" while Russia needed a
constitution immediately.
33
In addition to insisting that immediate adoption of the Constitu-
tion was essential, Yeltsin promptly silenced attempts by political can-
didates and parties to criticize his Constitution. Yeltsin had allocated
free television time, in anticipation of the December election, to each
of the thirteen political parties for campaign purposes.34 In the end of
November, Yeltsin assembled members of each party, threatening
them that he would rescind their free television access if they contin-
ued to attack Yeltsin's constitution.35 Yeltsin's Deputy Prime Minister
Vladimir Shumeiko even attempted to remove critical parties from
the ballot.a Yeltsin's tactics thus ensured adoption of the resolution.
HI. The Russian Constitution's Allocation of Power
A. General Distribution of Power
The Russian Constitution vests considerable power in the person
of the president. The president is defined as the head of state, guaran-
tor of the constitution, human and civil rights, and freedoms.3 7 The
president may "decide on the resignation of the Government of the
Russian Federation. 38 The president may also declare a state of
emergency 9 and issue binding decrees and executive orders, so long
as the decrees and executive orders do not "contravene the Constitu-
tion of the Russian Federation or federal laws."'  The president may
dissolve the Duma in certain circumstances.4 Yeltsin defended the
broad presidential powers by questioning:
But what else do you want to have, in a country which has got
accustomed to czars and rulers, in a country where there are no
clearly defined interest groups and where normal [political] par-
ties are just emerging, in a country where executive discipline is
33. See U
34. See Tony Barber, Russia.. Yeltsin Invites Vote Against Democracy, INDEPENDENT -
LONDON, Dec. 6, 1993.
35. See id. Not only did Yeltsin threaten to take away free television access, but a
study by Russian and American analysts showed that the pro-presidential party, Russia's
Choice, received twenty-eight minutes of television coverage on Russia's most important
television channel between November 9-21, while the leader of a moderate reformist party
received only ten seconds. See id.
36. See Shapiro, supra note 10; see also Barber, supra note 34.
37. See Russ. CONsT. art. 80(1) - (2).
38. IM. at art. 83(c).
39. See id. at art. 88.
40. See id. at art. 90(1) - (3).
41. See id. at art. 84(b).
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very slack and where juridical nihilism is so widespread? Would
you stake in such a country only or chiefly on Parliament? Well,
if you do so, just in six months-if not earlier-people will want
a dictator.4
2
By contrast, the bicameral Federal Assembly has relatively weak
powers. Russia's upper house, called the Federation Council, consists
of two representatives from each member of the Russian Federation.43
The lower house, called the State Duma, consists of 450 deputies."4
Unlike the presidential power to issue decrees, the jurisdiction of the
Federation Council and State Duma is enumerated in the constitu-
tion.4 5 The Duma may initiate impeachment proceedings of the presi-
dent only on the basis of a charge of high treason or other grave
crime.4 6 The Duma and Federation Council must pass the impeach-
ment vote by a two-thirds majority within three months of the initial
filing of the charge against the president.47 In addition, the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation must confirm the "presence of indicia
of crime in the President's actions," and the Constitutional Court of
Russia must confirm that the Duma followed proper impeachment
procedures."s
B. The Separation of Power
The Russian Constitution clearly states that the Russian Federa-
tion shall be governed by a system of separation of powers.49 The
doctrine of separation of powers provides that governmental power
should be separated among several different branches of govern-
ment.5 0 Important to this system are the checks and balances prevent-
ing one branch of government from exercising control over another.5'
An independent judiciary with the power of judicial review is also a
central aspect of separation of powers.52
The disproportionate amount of power granted to the president
42. Boris Yeltsin: As President, I am Interested in Social Stability More than Anyone
Else, supra note 30.
43. See Russ. CONST. arts. 94, 95(1) - (2).
44. See id. at art. 95(3).
45. See id. at arts. 102 - 103.
46. See id. at art. 93(1) - (2).
47. See id. at art. 93(1) - (3).
48. See id. at art. 93(1).
49. See id. at art. 10 ("State power in the Russian Federation shall be exercised on the
basis of the separation of the legislative, executive and judiciary branches. The bodies of
legislative, executive and judiciary powers shall be independent.").
50. See Amy J. Weisman, Separation of Powers in Post-Communist Government: A
Constitutional Case Study of the Russian Federation, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 1365,
1366 (1995).
51. See id. at 1367.
52. See i.
infringes upon this system.5 3 First, the president is the guarantor of
the constitution." To execute this role, the president may "use dis-
pute settlement procedures to settle differences between organs of
state power of the Russian Federation .... [and] [i]f no decision is
agreed upon, he may turn the dispute over for review by the respec-
tive court of law."'55 This power usurps the traditional role of the judi-
ciary in a separation of powers system.5 6 The president thus may
resolve a dispute in the executive's favor and then refuse to turn the
matter over to the courts for review. 7
Second, the president has substantial legislative powers under the
1993 constitution. While the legislative power of the Federal Assem-
bly is articulated in some detail, 8 and does not provide for the addi-
tion of powers not already enumerated,5 9 the president may issue
decrees and executive orders limited only in that they are not in con-
ffict with the Russian Constitution or federal laws.6
Thus the president can rule by decrees on any issue, or, indeed,
many issues, until the legislature acts in conflict. Practically, however,
if the president acts on an issue, then the legislature has no incentive
to act.6 ' Thus there is no incentive for the many political factions in
the parliament to compromise to effectively rule the country.62 The
legislature therefore becomes a rubber stamp parliament with the
president effectively ruling the country as an autocrat. 63 These "un-
limited powers to legislate through presidential decree" has drawn
scathing criticism:
It is this right to rule by decree, a right which ignores completely
the separation of powers between the legislative and executive
branches of government, which represents the biggest step back
towards an arbitrary dictatorship since Mikhail Gorbachev
53. See id. at 1372; see also David Satter, The Failure of Russian Reformers, WALL ST.
J., May 13, 1996, at A20 (arguing that the 1993 constitution stalled the reform process in
Russia by failing to establish a political system based on a "reasonable separation of
powers.").
54. See Russ. CoNs?. art. 80(2).
55. Id at art. 85(1).
56. See Weisman, supra note 50, at 1373.
57. See id.
58. See Russ. CONST. arts. 102 - 103
59. See id. (In addition to listing several specific duties, the jurisdiction of both the
Federation Council and the State Duma allows for resolutions of issues within the jurisdic-
tion of the Russian Constitution).
60. See Russ. Co0sT. art. 90(1) & (3).
61. See Anatole Kaletsky, Sunday Comment" Mr. Yeltsin's Nightmare at the Finland
Station, SuNDAY TELEGRAPH LONDON, Dec. 12, 1993, at 30.
62. See id.
63. Russia has had repeated experiences attempting to create a parliamentary body
that in effect turned out to be nothing more than a rubber stamp. The results have been
disastrous, as will be discussed, infra, at section IV.C.
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launched glasnost. Ironically, it may also endanger Yeltsin's
ability to impose his will on his vast and ungovernable country.6 4
If the legislature does enact a law conflicting with a presidential
decree, or vice versa, however, the constitution does not state that the
conflicting decree would be automatically invalid.65 In fact, Yeltsin
has exercised this power to pass unconstitutional decrees.6 In June,
1994, Yeltsin passed a decree allowing for the detention of suspects by
police for up to thirty days without formal charges.67 Even though the
decree violates several constitutional provisions, and Yeltsin himself
acknowledged possible impairment of human rights because of the de-
cree, he refused to rescind it.68
Third, like the presidential ability to rule by decree, the constitu-
tional provisions allowing for the presidential dissolution of the Duma
prevent the parliament from developing independently of the presi-
dent. If the Duma rejects the president's candidate for prime minister
three times, then the president may dissolve the Duma and call for
new elections.69 The president may also dissolve the Duma if it passes
a no confidence vote in the government twice within three months.70
Further, the Russian Prime Minister may ask the State Duma for a
vote of confidence in the government.7' If the Duma passes a vote of
no confidence, the president may within seven days decide to resign
the government.72 The Duma can thus avoid dismissal by simply ac-
quiescing to the president. Because the president may manipulate
these provisions, for example by choosing clearly unacceptable candi-
dates for prime minister or by forcing the Duma through the prime
minister to conduct a no-confidence vote, the Duma has a strong dis-
incentive to be critical of the president.71
Finally, the president under the 1993 Constitution is "almost be-
yond impeachment."'74 The Duma would have to accuse the president
of treason or other serious crime, and the Supreme Court must con-
64. Kaletsky, supra note 61. Kaletsky argues, persuasively, that Yeltsin will run into
problems trying to implement his policies in the vast Russian Federation, which spans
eleven time zones. Yeltsin does not act like a dictator, so his laws will not be followed out
of fear. See id. On the other hand, he is acting without the benefit of the democratically
elected, local officials, which further may frustrate implementation in the farther regions.
See id.
65. See Weisman, supra note 53, at 1374 n.66.
66. See id. at 1375 n.67.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Russ. CoNsT. art. 111(4).
70. See id at art. 117(3).
71. See id at art. 117(4).
72. See id
73. See Hiltzik, supra note 23.
74. David Hearst, President Above and Beyond Parliament Russia's Draft Constitution
Vastly Strengthens Boris Yeltsin, GuARDiAN, Nov. 10, 1993, at 10.
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firm the crime.75 The Russian Constitutional Court no longer has any
power to impeach the president.76 Since treason is defined as advo-
cating the overthrow of the government, and the president is the head
of the government under the constitution, it is questionable whether
the Duma could in fact bring treason charges against a Russian presi-
dent, since the president may not commit treason against himself.77
Yeltsin seemed to realize that the constitution as written violated
the separation of powers. He urged voters to adopt the constitution
so that the new parliament would not have to draft a new constitution
and get "bogged down in contradictions with the president over the
separation of powers and other constitutional issues. '78 Yeltsin ac-
knowledged the increased presidential power in the 1993 Constitution
and promoted its necessity. It is likely that he wanted to create a
strong presidency to ensure against a parliament like the one elected
in 1990, which delayed reform and was ultimately disbanded by Yelt-
sin in 1993. 79
Yeltsin's 1993 constitution proclaims itself to be a document
founded on the rule of law and separation of powers. In fact, it is a
document that legitimizes autocratic presidential power. The presi-
dent may act outside the written law and may, without any real possi-
bility of reproach, disregard duly enacted laws. Even though Yeltsin's
motives appear to be consistent with promoting democracy, the result-
ing near-autocratic powers of the president and weak parliamentary
powers in a shell separation of powers system could lead to drastic
consequences in the future. In a worst-case scenario, without true
separation of powers, a dictator-tyrant could use the constitutionally-
granted presidential powers to legally revert to a Stalinist regime. As
a democratically elected president, though, a tyrant could operate
under the facade of democracy with no one the wiser.
C. Criticism and Support for the Constitutional Distribution of Power
Criticism of Yeltsin's constitution came from all sides. Gennady
Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party in Russia, stated that
"[t]he pharaoh, the tsar, and the general secretary did not have such
powers" as the president in the constitution.80 Zyuganov also asserted
that adoption of the constitution would create a presidential dictator-
75. See Russ. CONST. art 93(1).
76. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the mechanism for enforcing the
constitution became the Constitutional Court. See Lien, supra note 10, at 90.
77. See Laura Duncan, Constitutional Experts Here See Risks in New Russian Docu-
ment, Cm. DAILY L. BULL, Dec. 14, 1993, at 3. In fact, the Duma has attempted to im-
peach Yeltsin, which will be discussed, infra, at section IV.B.
78. Hiltzik, supra note 23.
79. See id,
80. Barber, supra note 34.
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ship. 81 Many of the thirteen parties running in the parliamentary elec-
tions, held the same day as the constitutional referendum, "attacked
the constitution as a document that will stifle democracy at birth. '
A political commentator of the Russian newspaper Izvestia said that
"[t]he only real checks and balances in Russia are Yeltsin's personal
qualities and inclinations. 83 Critics claimed that the composition of
the parliament after the elections would matter little if the constitu-
tion passed, since Yeltsin could overcome any objections to his poli-
cies. 84 The constitution was considered to be "tailor-made" for
Yeltsin.85
Not everyone, however, criticized the strong presidential power
in the constitution. Supporters note that the upper house of parlia-
ment, the Federation Council, may never be dissolved by the presi-
dent.86 In addition, Russia's previous parliament was perceived as
adverse to compromise and did not respond to the nation's needsY
Therefore, it was said, a parliamentary system with a strong president
was the only system with a chance of succeeding.88 This argument has
some merit, because, for the most part, the presidential powers in
Yeltsin's constitution mirror those of Western parliamentary democra-
cies.8 9 In fact, the Russian Constitution is often compared to the
French Constitution in that both documents withhold legislative
power from the president.90
Although Yeltsin had been described as autocratic, abrasive, and
exceedingly demanding, he has also seemed to be devoted to democ-
81. See Hiltzik, supra note 23.
82. Barber, supra note 34.
83. !L; see also Kaletsky, supra note 61.
84. See Barber, supra note 34; see also Kaletsky, supra note 61.
85. Duncan, supra note 77.
86. See Sam Lambroza, The Russian Constitution Marks an Impressive Beginning,
WASH. TimEs, Dec. 10, 1993, at A27.
87. See Russia's New Game, WALL ST. J. EUR., Dec. 14, 1993, at 10.
88. See i&.
89. See Lambroza, supra note 86 (comparing the Russian president's ability to dissolve
parliament with comparable powers in England, France, and Germany.).
90. See Metcalf, supra note 11. On the other hand, the legislative authority of the
president in Russia is substantially greater than in France. See id. For example, the Rus-
sian president may veto legislation, propose referenda, and has greater authority to issue
decrees than his French counterpart. See id. In this sense the Russian Constitution is simi-
lar to Latin American presidential regimes, such as Chile, Columbia, and Brazil. See id.
Further, France does not have the same long tradition of autocratic rule. See Duncan,
supra note 77. Therefore, although the Russian constitution is similar to the French consti-
tution, the increased legislative powers of the president in Russia serve to erode the barri-
ers between the branches of government, making a shell of the system of separation of
powers. See id.; but cf. Lambroza, supra note 86 (arguing that, although Russia is not
"practiced in democracy," it can change by practicing the principles enunciated in the
constitution.).
RUSSIA'S 1993 CONSTITUTION
racy.91 Yeltsin proved to be "no tyrant."'92 Despite Yeltsin's dictator-
like actions in the fall of 1993, when he disbanded the Congress and
Supreme Soviet, he has since then allowed competition among the
political parties and shown no signs of abusing the political or human
rights of even his worst critics.93
A forceful Yeltsin critic and former chairman of the Constitu-
tional Court acknowledged that the constitution had "strong authori-
tarian parts," but stated that, "it's better to have a bad constitution
than no constitution.... [and] it's better than to live in an authorita-
rian regime without a constitution or Parliament."'94 When ultra-na-
tionalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky won a large percentage of the votes in
the State Duma in the December 1993 election, one commentator
noted that, "[m]aybe a strong presidency in Russia isn't such a bad
thing after all." 95 Now, five years after the adoption of the constitu-
tion, it still remains to be seen how Russia will fare without Yeltsin as
leader.
D. Russian Tradition of Modernizing Autocrats
A system with a powerful president fits well in Russia's history,
which is replete with autocrats beginning with the tsars and culminat-
ing in the dictatorships of Lenin and Stalin. Peter the Great, for ex-
ample, who ruled from 1696-1785, sought to Westernize Russia. To
modernize Russia, Peter had to amass great personal powers.96 Peter
did such things as change Russia's outdated calendar to the western
European Julian Calendar, 97 founded St. Petersburg as Russia's "win-
dow to the West," 98 established a regular army, founded a navy,9 9 re-
formed the Russian alphabet, and encouraged education.1°°
Politically and legally, Peter created the Governing Senate which ac-
ted as a chief executive and legislative body, even though it could only
implement Peter's will and not act on its own.1 1 Peter also intro-
duced some degree of formalism in the Russian legal system, though
91. See Lambroza, supra note 86.
92. Kaletsky, supra note 61.
93. See iUt; but see Barber, supra note 34 (arguing that Yeltsin's attempt to ban polit-
ical parties who were critical of the constitution from the election showed that Yeltsin
"regard[ed] criticism and free debate as best a nuisance, [and] at worst political
subversion.").
94. Hiltzik, supra note 23.
95. Russia's New Game, supra note 87.
96. See Barber, supra note 34.
97. See RONALD HINGLEY, RussIA: A CONCISE HSTORY 74-75 (Thames and Hudson
1991) (1972).
98. Id at 77.
99. See itt at 78.
100. See iUt at 78-79.
101. See Lien, supra note 10, at 53.
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his autocratic tendencies stifled progress in the area of public law.' °2
Most significant, at the end of Peter's life, he created the office of the
Procurator General, which served as the "principal guardian of legal-
ity," ensuring that the Senate acted within its boundaries and that
tsarist edicts were promptly executed.10 3
Peter often used barbarous and unscrupulous tactics to effect
political reform."° For example, Peter built St. Petersburg on a
swamp using countless serfs, tens of thousand of which perished under
the appalling conditions."°5 Also, Peter's son, who did not agree with
Peter's views, escaped Russia only to be lured back by Peter and sub-
sequently murdered by him in prison.1 °6 Peter's social reforms,
though quite extraordinary, tended to benefit only the upper classes.
Peter was unable to improve the lives of the majority of Russia's peo-
ple, the peasants.0 7 As a result of the combination of Peter's reforms
and the lack of progress made by the peasantry, the end of Peter's
reign was marked by a vast cultural rift between the new upper class
and the lower classes.' 0 8
The experience from Peter's time holds resonance today. Like
Peter, Yeltsin in 1993 was, in a sense, trying to catch Russia up to
Western democracies. Russia was failing as a superpower and needed
to start again as a democracy. Boris Yeltsin has, through his actions
and through his constitution, forced Russia through many difficult
steps on the road to true democracy. In 1991, Yeltsin became the first
democratically elected president in Russia's history. Like Peter,
though, he has been forced at times to resort to undemocratic means
and the effects are not always beneficial to everyone. His autocratic
tendencies have slowed the legislative process. 09 As Yeltsin's final
presidential term winds down, the question remains how Yeltsin's suc-
cessor will govern under Yeltsin's constitution.
IV. The Constitution in Practice
Many questions about how the 1993 Constitution would be imple-
mented have been addressed in the past five years. Yeltsin showed
102. See id. at 54.
103. See id Interestingly, the practice of having the Procuracy rather than the judiciary
protect legality endured through tsarist times and the Soviet regime. See id. This may
explain, if only in part, why Yeltsin's constitution grants the executive the role of guarantor
of the constitution rather than more traditional judicial review of a separation of powers
system.
104. See HINGLEY, supra note 97, at 79.
105. See id at 77.
106. See id. at 81.
107. See id.
108. See id
109. See discussion, infra, at section IV.
himself to be authoritarian and inclined to govern Russia himself,
without the help of the parliament. The parliament, in turn, has at-
tempted to topple Yeltsin, but could never muster enough support.
As Yeltsin's health and physical ability to govern deteriorated, how-
ever, Yeltsin has backed down from his dictator-like stance. Because
of Yeltsin's actions as president, it appears that only Yeltsin's succes-
sor will know the fate of the country, as that person will be able to
rule by personality rather than by law.
A. Presidential Rule By Decree
When Yeltsin was arguing for the support of his constitutional
draft, he defended the presidential decree power as necessary to gov-
ern the country until the newly elected parliament could pass perma-
nent laws."10 This has not been the case in practice, however. Yeltsin
has used the constitutional decree power to legislate. For example,
when the Duma was on the verge of passing legislation that prohibited
the sale of farm land, Yeltsin issued a decree doing the exact oppo-
site."' Similarly, Yeltsin has been unwilling, or unable, to compro-
mise with the parliament in order to pass economic reforms. To
institute his reforms more quickly, he issues decrees that have imme-
diate force of law."12
Yeltsin's decrees have not always been altruistic reform measures
intended to benefit the country. Yeltsin has used his decree power to
grant favor and political power to businesses, friends, and political al-
lies.113 Examples abound. First, Yeltsin in 1993 issued a decree al-
lowing a sports fund, which was headed by Yeltsin's tennis partner, to
import alcohol and tobacco into Russia without paying duty." 4 The
tax breaks caused by the decree reportedly cost Russia $200 million a
year. 5 In 1995 Yeltsin created an oil company from several divisions
of a state-owned firm." 6 The oil industry is the most profitable busi-
ness in Russia, and with a stroke of a pen Yeltsin was able to reserve a
remunerative share of that industry for the government-and away
from the private sector. 17 Further, just months after he created the
oil company, Yeltsin decreed that it be sold at an auction in exchange
110. See David Hofftan, Russia Votes-For a Czar; Yeltsin Gave the Post-Soviet Presi-
dency Enormous, Arbitrary Power Over Nation, WASH. POST, June 16, 1996, at Al.
111. See id
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See Russia Votes-For a Czar; Yeltsin Gave the Post-Soviet Presidency Enormous,
Arbitrary Power Over Nation, supra note 110.
117. See id.
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for bank loans.118
In addition, Yeltsin appointed a loyal confidant, Lt. Gen. Alexan-
der Korzhakov, as cabinet minister and presidential aide of the highest
rank.119 Although not on its face unusual, Korzhakov is a former
KGB officer who now commands a paramilitary security operation
that can import and export weapons, design weapons, and, extraordi-
narily, work in the private sector as well. 20 In May, 1996, Yeltsin is-
sued a decree pardoning the former director of the Yaroslavl water
supply, Vladimir Petrov. 2 ' Petrov had been incarcerated on charges
of embezzlement and corruption. 22 In this case, Yeltsin effectively
took the place of the court. 2
Yeltsin's ability to rule by decree has gone largely unchecked dur-
ing his presidency,124 but Yeltsin has not governed absolutely. Yeltsin
has had to concede to the wishes of those that have power in Post-
Soviet Russia, such as the prosperous regions who want to retain their
own tax money and natural resources.'5 For example, although Yelt-
sin has near absolute power in Moscow, he has been signing "power-
sharing" agreements with other Russian regions.' 26 These agreements
give the regions special tax breaks and control over property, allowing
them to be more independent of the will of the Kremlin. 127
Yeltsin's proclivity for ruling by decree has significant conse-
quences. First, the legislature is not given the opportunity to develop
policy, learn compromise, and govern the country.' 8 Second, his de-
crees, not passed by the legislature, may simply be overturned by the
next president. 29 Third, by granting more autonomous power to the
individual regions, Yeltsin weakens the presidency because local offi-
cials will not effect his decisions but instead demand to govern
themselves.130
118. See id Not surprisingly, one of the banks that bought the company was one with
strong Kremlin connections. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id
121. See id
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Kaletsky, supra note 61.
129. See Russia Votes-For a Czar; Yeltsin Gave the Post-Soviet Presidency Enormous,
Arbitrary Power Over Nation, supra note 110.
130. See id
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B. Duma Dissolution and Constitutional Issues
Since the adoption of the Russian Constitution and parliamentary
elections in 1993, the Duma has had few options for expressing dissat-
isfaction with Yeltsin and his government. Indeed, it seems that the
only way that the Duma has been able to make any noise or get atten-
tion is by voting no-confidence or threatening impeachment. So far,
however, a constitutional crisis has been averted.
During the Russian war with the break-off republic Chechnya,
the Duma voted no-confidence in Yeltsin's government in an attempt
to coerce Yeltsin to dismiss certain officials. In June, 1995, after
Chechen rebels raided a southern Russian town and took hundreds of
hostages, the Duma voted no-confidence, demanding that Yeltsin dis-
miss the officials responsible for the situation.131 Yeltsin and Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin responded by asking the Duma to hold
another no-confidence vote and declaring that Yeltsin would dismiss
the Duma if it did not back down.'32 Prime Minister Chernomyrdin
chastised the Duma, stating that, "[t]he Duma decision destroys coop-
eration between the executive and legislative power and destabilizes
the situation in the country.' 1 33 The Duma, which blamed just three
of Yeltsin's cabinet members for the hostage crisis, and not the entire
government, had no constitutional means of removal of individual
ministers. 34 In what appeared to be an effort to compromise, Yeltsin
subsequently fired the three ministers to which the Duma objected. 35
In the end, the parliament succumbed in a vote thirty-three votes
short of no-confidence. 36 Although touted as a historical compro-
mise, many believed that the vote would have been the same had Yelt-
sin refused to discharge the offensive ministers. 37 The Duma was
unwilling to take its objections of the government so far as to cause a
constitutional crisis and its own dismissal. 3 Dismissal of the Duma
131. See Steven Gutterman, Russian Leaders Challenge Lawmakers, UNtruD PRSS
INT'L., June 22, 1995.
132. See id.
133. Id. "Cooperation" seems to have meant "acquiescence to Yeltsin."
134. See Doomed Duma, AsiN WALL ST. J., June 26, 1995, at 10. In a token gesture,
however, the Duma took a separate vote for the dismissal of three ministers. See id.
135. See Lee Hockstader, Anti-Yeltsin Vote Fails in Moscow; No-Confidence Vote Falls
Short of Required Majority in Duma, WASH. PosT, July 2, 1995, at A22.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. A year earlier, the Duma took a no-confidence vote in response to "black
Tuesday," when the ruble lost twenty-one percent of its international value. See Marina
Lapenkova, Government Faces Parliament Censure After Chechen Fiasco, AGENcE
FRANCE PREssE, June 21, 1995. Although the vote failed by over thirty votes, one-third of
the Duma did not even appear, choosing to voice their dissatisfaction through abstention.
See Washington Post Foreign Service, Yeltsin Government Survives No-Confidence Vote,
WASH. POsT, Oct. 28, 1994, at A35.
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would mean that the legislators would lose the privileges afforded to
them by virtue of their office, such as computers, modem offices, and
free apartments.139
Another means by which the Duma has shown its disapproval of
Yeltsin has been by attempting to impeach him. At the same time as
the no-confidence vote in June of 1995, the Duma undertook to initi-
ate preliminary impeachment procedures against Yeltsin. 40 The sup-
port of 150 Dumna members (two-thirds) is required to officially begin
impeachment procedures, however, and the Duma reportedly gath-
ered no more than one hundred. 14 1 Again, in December, 1996, the
Duma scheduled a discussion of impeachment proceedings and a vote
of no-confidence. 42 At this time, Yeltsin had withdrawn the last re-
maining troops from Chechnya, a move that the Duma viewed as un-
constitutionally conceding to the rebel republic's independence. 143
The Duma backed down in recognition that Yeltsin was recovering
from multiple bypass heart surgery. 44 Less than two months later,
the Duma voted 102 to 87 against adopting a draft resolution on im-
peaching Yeltsin on the basis of ill health. 45 The Duma did vote in
favor of adopting the resolution as a basis for further debate, however,
showing that the issue was not closed. 46
In mid-1998, regional legislatures began to pass motions to im-
peach Yeltsin. 47 Although the individual regions have no actual
power to impeach Yeltsin, the regional motions were significant.'
48
They showed that the regions were unhappy with the government and
were willing to "demand[] a fundamental change of economic
course."' 49 Further, the motions indicated a unification of the re-
gional deputies behind a single mandate to topple Yeltsin.' 50 Mean-
139. See Hockstader, supra note 135.
140. See Doomed Duma, supra note 134.
141. See id. It is unlikely that the Duma would be able to impeach Yeltsin, even if the
Duma did get the required two-thirds vote. The Supreme Court, which must confirm the
impeachment vote, is highly politicized in favor of Yeltsin and would be unlikely to vote
against him. See id.
142. See Genine Babakian, Communists Retreat from Yeltsin Impeachment Vote, USA
TODAY, Dec. 2, 1996, at 4A.
143. See id.
144. See id. Communist leader Gennady Zyganov stated, "[tjhe president is sick. Let
him get better." Id.
145. See Urgent Duma Rejects Draft Resolution on Impeaching Yeltsin, AGENCE
FRANCE PRFssE, Jan. 22, 1997. The Duma was forty-two votes shy of passing the resolu-
tion. See id
146. See id.
147. See Dmitry Zaks, Coal Miners Stop Trains Once Again, Moscow TIMES, July 2,
1998, at No. 1486.
148. See id
149. Id.
150. See id.
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while, several Duma deputies opposed to Yeltsin formed a committee
to work toward impeachment.'
In August, 1998, Yeltsin and Duma leaders reached a tentative
agreement by which the Duma agreed to refrain from attempts to im-
peach Yeltsin or pass votes of no-confidence in Yeltsin's govern-
ment.' 52 In return, Yeltsin promised not to dismiss the parliament.
53
Communist leader Zyuganov initially endorsed the plan, but changed
his mind after meeting with Communist Party leaders. 4 Prime Min-
ister Primakov made an identical offer in January, 1999, in an attempt
to prevent the Duma from voting on impeaching Yeltsin, but the offer
was rejected.' 55
Finally, in December, 1998, the speaker of the Duma, Gennady
Seleznyov, announced that the Duma would vote in January on an
impeachment charge against Yeltsin for waging the war in
Chechnya.'5 6 The parliamentary committee was continuing its investi-
gation on three other counts of impeachment, including instigation of
and participation in the collapse of the Soviet Union and his orders to
send tanks to dispel parliamentary rebellion in 1993.11 In addition,
the committee was considering a charge of "genocide of the Russian
people," effectively blaming Yeltsin for the decline of the Russian
population as a result of a high death rate and low birth rate. 58 On
February 18, 1999, the Duma impeachment commission presented its
findings on five counts of impeachment. 59 The Duma scheduled a
debate on these counts for April 15, 1999.16° Just two days before the
scheduled debate, the Duma postponed the impeachment vote.161
This delay was seen as the end to the Communist-driven preoccupa-
tion with impeaching Yeltsin.' 62
151. See id.; see also Svetlana Ilyina, A Specter of Parliamentary Revolution,
NEZAVISiMAYA GAzErA, Apr. 9, 1998, at 3, summarized in Russ. PRxs DIG.
152. See International Affairs, Russian Parliament Rejects Chernomyrdin as Premier;
Crisis Overshadows U.S. Summit; Other Developments, FAcrS ON FILE WORLD NEWS
DIG., Sept. 3, 1998, at C1.
153. See id.
154. See id. Zyganov denounced the plan in a televised debate, declaring that it "had
too many loopholes" and did "not guarantee anything." Id.
155. See Daniel Williams, Russian Premier Offers Deal That Would Weaken Yeltsin,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 26, 1999, at A14.
156. See Report: Yeltsin Impeachment Nears, UNITED PRrss INT'L, Dec. 22, 1998.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Comment and Analysis; Country Profile; Forecast, Russia: Yeltsin's Poor
Health, Conflict with Parliament, HaYE CoUNTRY REP., Feb. 1999, at 8.
160. See David Hoffman, Premier Urges Halt to Efforts to Oust Yeltsin; Russian Parlia-
ment's Move Could Undermine Primakov, WAsH. PosT, Apr. 11, 1999, at A19.
161. See Sharon LaFraniere, Russian Legislature Delays Vote to Impeach; Move Likely
Ends Effort to Oust Yeltsin, WASH. PosT, Apr. 13, 1999, at A13.
162. See id.
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The Duma has not been alone in causing tension between parlia-
ment and the president. In 1998, Yeltsin dismissed his prime minister
twice, narrowly averting constitutional crises. At the end of March,
1998, Yeltsin suddenly dismissed Prime Minister Viktor Cherno-
myrdin.' 63 Chernomyrdin had been prime minister since 1992.14
Yeltsin named his energy minister, Sergei Kiriyenko, as prime minis-
ter. 65 When the Duma rejected Kiriyenko's nomination by a vote of
186 against and 143 for, Yeltsin immediately renominated him, stating
"I have no other candidate."'166 The Duma rejected him again. 67
When Yeltsin again renominated Kiriyenko, Yeltsin gave the
Duma an ultimatum: either confirm his nomination or face dissolu-
tion.' 61 Yeltsin promised, if the Duma again rejected Kiriyenko, to
appoint him by decree.' 69 Yeltsin, counting on the Duma deputies to
act in their own self-interest, circulated a letter in the Duma informing
members that, in the event of dissolution, each deputy would have to
vacate their free state apartments, accept a one-way ticket to their
home region, and comply with a weight allowance for transporting
their belongings. 7 ° Many deputies agreed to compromise for fear of
losing their jobs. 7'
By a vote of 251 to 25 against, the Duma approved Kiriyenko as
prime minister.'72 The Duma, however, was not pleased. Ultra-na-
tionalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky likened the "compromise" to a choice
between tuberculosis and a cold.'73 A Communist deputy from a
southern city stated, "[t]his was done only under threat of destruc-
tion.... The Duma was forced to do this to keep itself alive."' 74 He
continued that, had the Duma been dissolved, then the situation
would have been worse because Yeltsin could have ruled by decree
and would have been out of control.' 75
163. See David Hoffman, Ousted Russian Prime Minister to Seek Presidency, WASH.
PosT, Mar. 29, 1998, at A30.
164. See id.
165. Daniel Williams, Yeltsin Pushes for Premier's Approval; Party Leaders are Hedging
Bets, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1998, at A19.
166. See Daniel Williams, Parliament Rejects Kiriyenko; As Expected, Yeltsin Renomi-
nates Prime Minister Candidate, WASH. POsT, Apr. 11, 1998, at A9.
167. See Daniel Williams, Premier Vote May Seal Russian Legislature's Fate, WASH.
POST, Apr. 23, 1998, at A34.
168. See Genine Babakian, Kremlin Clash Coming to a Head; Vote on Premier Could
Lead to a New Parliament, USA TODAY, Apr. 23, 1998, at 13A.
169. See id.
170. See Premier Vote May Seal Russian Legislature's Fate, supra note 167.
171. See Babakian, supra note 168.
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175. See id.
Despite the fact he had fought so hard for Kiriyenko's appoint-
ment, a mere four months later, Yeltsin again dismissed his prime
minister for enacting emergency measures that caused an economic
crisis in Russia.176 On August 23, 1998, Yeltsin reappointed Viktor
Chernomyrdin as prime minister.177 A week later, the Duma rejected
Chemomyrdin. 78  Yeltsin immediately renominated him. 7 9  The
Duma rejected him again.' 80 The Communist leader Zyuganov stated
that his party, the largest in the Duma, would never accept Cherno-
myrdin.181 He also asserted that dissolution of the Duma would be
illegal and lead to civil unrest.' 82 After a tense several days, Yeltsin
avoided a showdown by nominating Yevgeny Primakov as prime min-
ister, who was accepted by the Duma. 83
Although Yeltsin avoided a constitutional crisis in these cases, his
deference to the Duma showed declining strength.' 84 In the last five
years, Yeltsin has shown a strong dislike for compromise and a ten-
dency to do things his own way.' 85 Case in point was his insistence
four months earlier in nominating Kiriyenko and forcing the Duma to
accept him as prime minister. However, by later giving in to the
Duma, he showed political weakness that is likely to only increase in
the future. 186 In addition to a lack of political strength, Yeltsin's phys-
ical strength has decreased as well. Yeltsin's health has been poor
since he had heart bypass surgery in 1996 and a series of complaints
has kept him in the hospital for much of the time since September,
176. See Russian Parliament Rejects Chernomyrdin as Premier; Crisis Overshadows U.S.
Summit; Other Developments, supra note 152.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Dave Montgomery, Yeltsin Nominee Rejected Again; Fiscal Crisis Getting
Worse, REcoRD (Bergen County, NJ), Sept. 8, 1998, at Al.
181. See id. Zyganov also said that the Duma would impeach Yeltsin if he attempted to
resubmit Chernomyrdin as candidate for prime minister. See Sharon LaFraniere, Legisla-
tive Leaders Decry Moscow's Political Vacuum; Quick Formation of Government Sought,
WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1998, at A26.
182. See Daniel Williams, Parliament Awaits Yeltsin's Next Move; 2nd Rebuff of Nomi-
nee for Premier Leaves Crisis-Ridden Nation Facing Political Void, WASH. Posr, Sept. 9,
1998, at A22. Zyganov stated, "[d]issolution would not mean dissolution of the Duma, but
the disbandment of the Russian Federation. A mistake by the president and his team may
have the price of civil peace in society." Id.
183. See Daniel Williams, Primakov Earns Broad Support Through Unclear Ideology,
WASH. PoST, Sept. 11, 1998, at A20.
184. See id. Some Russian observers opined that the Primakov nomination marked the
end of the Yeltsin era. See id.
185. See Return of the Ancien Regime, WASH. PoST, Sept. 11, 1998, at A30.
186. See David Hoffman, Diplomat is Named Russian Premier; Yeltsin Backs Down,
Drops Chernomyrdin, WASH. PoST, Sept. 11, 1998, at Al.
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1998.'- 71
C. Turmoil in 1999
The tension between Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament thick-
ened in 1999. In April, when the Duma was scheduled to begin im-
peachment proceedings against Yeltsin, Yeltsin's aides indicated that
Yeltsin would fire his cabinet, including Primakov, or disband Parlia-
ment.188 The constitutional issue becomes more complicated here, as
according to the Constitution, Yeltsin may not disband the Russian
Parliament during an impeachment inquiry.189 Thus, if the Duma be-
gan impeachment proceedings, Yeltsin would not be able to fire his
prime minister and then threaten Duma dissolution if the Duma failed
to confirm Yeltsin's new candidates for prime minister.
On Wednesday, May 12, Yeltsin fired Primakov as prime minis-
ter, just one month after the Duma voted to defer an impeachment
vote against President Yeltsin. 190 Yeltsin saw Primakov as a threat;
Primakov was too popular, too close to the Communists, and had de-
veloped his own independent political power.' 9' Immediately the
Duma and the rest of the world reacted. Focus was centered on Yelt-
sin's perceived lack of control of Russia, his visibly declining health,
and his apparent inability to function.192
The Duma instantly voted, in a non-binding resolution, 243 for
and 20 against, calling for Yeltsin to resign.' 9 The Communist Party,
who favored Primakov, voiced loud criticism of Yeltsin's decision.' 4
In the meantime, Yeltsin nominated Sergei Stepashin, the interior
minister and first deputy prime minister, as Primakov's replace-
187. See Reuters, Yeltsin is Hospitalized Again for Ulcer Treatment, N.Y. Tnms, Feb.
28, 1999, at 10. Yeltsin has been hospitalized between September 1998 and March 1999 for
bronchitis, exhaustion, pneumonia, and a bleeding stomach ulcer. See id.
188. See Hoffman, supra note 160.
189. See Russ. CONST. art. 109(4).
190. See Thomas Graham, Yeltsin Is the Problem, WASH. PosT, May 13, 1999, at A27.
191. See id.
192. See Dangerous Russia, WASH. POsT, May 13, 1999, at A26. Yeltsin changes
premiers "because he can." See id. He is also "in uncertain control of his own faculties,"
as he "babbled so embarrassingly at an official ceremony that his aides persuaded Russian
television networks not to air the tape." Id Yeltsin has also been repeatedly referred to as
looking "puffy" and unable to speak clearly. See, e.g., David Hoffman, Yeltsin Dismisses
His Prime Minister; Primakov Scolded for Inaction on the Economy, WASH. PoST, May 13,
1999, at A01; Robert G. Kaiser, In Russia, Limited Visibility; Freer, But No More Secure in
Leadership, Statistics or Tomorrow, WASH. PosT, July 25, 1999, at B01; Daniel Williams,
Yeltsin Sacks Another Premier; Russian Parliament Taps the New No. 2 as His Successor,
WASH. POsT, Aug. 10, 1999, at A01; Fred Hiatt, Yeltsin the Democrat?, WAsH. Posr, July 4,
1999, at B07.
193. See Hoffman, supra note 192.
194. See id. Yeltsin's decision was called "extremely irresponsible-not from the point
of view of Yeltsin, but in terms of the welfare of the country." Id.
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ment.195 At the same time, the Duma also scheduled the beginning of
a debate to impeach Yeltsin, renewing the previous counts discussed
above.19
6
It is here that Russia faced a real constitutional dilemma. If the
Duma voted in favor of one count of impeachment, then Yeltsin
would be unable under the Russian Constitution to disband Parlia-
ment until the impeachment count(s) were decided upon by the Fed-
eration Council. The Federation Council must decide upon
impeachment within three months of the Duma vote of impeach-
ment.197 Three months, however, could be an eternity if Russia was in
a state of political chaos. It was unclear at the time what would hap-
pen if the Duma voted to impeach Yeltsin and then rejected Yeltsin's
candidate for prime minister three times. It would not be outside the
realm of possibility for Yeltsin to declare a state of emergency, as per-
mitted by the constitution, or issue a decree changing the constitu-
tional structure of the government.
The crisis, however, was averted when the impeachment attempt
failed by seventeen votes.198 The vote failed for many reasons: less
than half of the Duma members were present; five out of twenty-nine
invited witnesses showed up; Yeltsin was absent from view, diffusing
the situation; and the state television refused to broadcast the de-
bate.199 In the end, the impeachment vote likely failed because the
charges against Yeltsin attributed to him responsibility for the ills of
Russia in recent years to him.2°°
A short four days later, Yeltsin's candidate for prime minister,
Sergei Stepashin, was confirmed in a landslide vote of 301 to 55201
Stepashin was easily approved so soon after a possible impeachment
crisis because "some said they were tired of confrontation, some said
Yeltsin might appoint someone more objectionable if Stepashin were
rejected, and some declared they have been through so many prime
ministers they hardly care."2 "2
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See Russ. CoNsT. art. 93(3).
198. See David Hoffman, Bid to Impeach Yeltsin Defeated, Communists Lose Parlia-
ment Votes on All 5 Charges, WASH. Posr, May 16, 1999, at A21. The charge with the
highest amount of votes received 283 out of 300 required to pass. See id.
199. See David Hoffman, Effort to Impeach Yeltsin Falters; Communists Say They Will
Prevai4" Many Witnesses Fail to Show, WASH. PosT, May 15, 1999, at A17.
200. See Bid to Impeach Yeltsin Defeated Communists Lose Parliament Votes on All 5
Charges, supra note 198. "[IThe charges against the Russian president [sic] contain practi-
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1999, at A19.
202. See id.
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Less than three months later, Yeltsin fired Stepashin, quickly
naming a former intelligence officer, Vladimir Putin, as his succes-
sor.20 3 There was no reason for this move except that Yeltsin wanted
to name his successor. Stepashin's cabinet was to remain the same
and Putin seemed to offer nothing new in terms of reform or initia-
tives.2° The only difference between Putin and Stepashin was Putin's
interest in running for president." 5 The Duma confirmed Putin with-
out incident a week later.20 6
The recent events in Russia evoke potential for crisis and cau-
tious optimism, if that may be possible. On one hand, the constant
changes in government coupled with the legislature's focus on Yelt-
sin's antics take the attention of the Parliament, which should be con-
centrating on remedying the ills of Russian society, such as economic
woes and instability. In addition, all of these changes so close to Par-
liamentary elections in December and presidential elections in June
2000, indicate that it is futile to hope for change. There is simply no
time left for any real change. 0 7 The final, and most disturbing of pos-
sibilities, is that Yeltsin will find a way to draft a new constitution or
amend the current one, allowing himself to run for another term, con-
tinuing the instability of the last several years. For example, Yeltsin
has discussed a reunion with Belarus, a former Soviet republic. 208
Such a reunion could be the reason behind creating a new
constitution. 20 9
On the positive side, crises have been averted each time they
arose, and each issue was handled by remaining within the parameters
of the Constitution. Yeltsin did not declare a state of emergency nor
issue any decrees that would have interfered with the constitutional
processes. Although elections are quickly approaching, Yeltsin has
yet to make any attempt to run for another term and, indeed, has
consistently stated that he will not run.210 As it stands, Russia and the
world await what the future, and a Russia post-Yeltsin, will hold.
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D. A Parallel with the Past
In 1905, Tsar Nicholas II was an unpopular tsar largely because
Russia was losing the war with Japan."' Making matters worse, on
January 9, 1905, the Tsar's advisors ordered troops to open fire on a
peaceful procession of unarmed workers who were marching to the
Winter Palace212 in St. Petersburg.213 Hundreds were killed and Rus-
sians refer to the episode as Bloody Sunday and, after the incident,
began to refer to the Tsar as Bloody Nicholas." 4 This led to sporadic
violence and labor strikes, which caused interruptions to vital produc-
tion in much of the Russian Empire.215 Tsar Nicholas during this time
created the Soviet, an ordinary word that means "council" in Russian,
which was led by a revolutionary by the name of Trotsky. 6 On De-
cember 3, 1905, the police arrested members of the Soviet for political
insurrection and the military quashed a similar revolt in Moscow.217
This episode was deemed the revolution of 1905.
Despite the fact that Nicholas was still Tsar following the revolu-
tion of 1905, his power was greatly diminished.21 8 As a concession to
political opposition, Nicholas had allowed the creation of a State
Duma.2 19 A constituent body, consisting of those loyal to the Tsar,
elected the Duma members and its decisions were subject to veto by
the State Soviet and the Tsar himself.220 Although the Duma had
very weak power, the Tsar no longer could pass legislation without the
Duma's consent, thus rendering the Tsar's power no longer abso-lute.221 But Tsar Nicholas refused to allow too many incursions on his
autocratic power, and in 1906 he promulgated a set of "Fundamental
Laws" which included the power of the Tsar to call elections, disband
the Duma, and issue decrees." Between 1906 and 1917, four Dumas
were elected.2' The Tsar dissolved the first and second Dumas for
failing to comply with his wishes, the third served the full term, and
the fourth was interrupted by the 1917 Revolution.22 4 Dissolution of
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the Dumas "fueled revolutionary activity and increased terrorism."' 2 5
In response, the Tsar attempted to appease the people by instituting
reform measures and heralding the beginning of a "constitutional
monarchy.""2 6 But because there was no obligation for the Tsar as the
executive to compromise with the legislature and no means for ensur-
ing that the government obey constitutional norms, the period has
been described as "sham constitutionalism."'227 The unrest culminated
in the October Revolution of 1917, in which the dictatorship of Lenin,
and eventually Stalin, began.
The parallels of the end of Tsar Nicholas' reign to the past five
years in Russian history are striking. The current situation is much
like the sham constitutionalism during the early part of the twentieth
century. The Duma is unable to act independently and effectively
apart from the president. Although Yeltsin has been, by and large, a
popular president, his presidency is coming to an end and it is unclear
who will succeed him. In addition, political unrest and dissatisfaction
is increasing, evidenced in part by the demand of individual regions to
govern themselves and the Duma's constant tension with Yeltsin.
Like Nicholas, Yeltsin tries, often unsuccessfully, to implement re-
forms to improve the situation for Russians, while at the same time
preserving his own absolute power. Yeltsin's unwillingness to yield
any authority to the Duma inhibits Russia's progress towards becom-
ing a republican democracy. The similarities with the past show the
importance of Yeltsin's successor and how he will govern Russia.
V. A Look to the Future
Yeltsin's presidential term concludes in 2000, when elections will
be held. No one candidate stands out as a clear front-runner. In the
eight years that Yeltsin has been president, he has governed more as a
tsar would, rather than a president. "Yeltsin sees himself more as an
emperor and father of the nation .... For him it is very difficult to
comprehend that he has to share power with another democratic insti-
tution, such as the parliament." 8  "Power is his ideology, his
friend .... Everything that is beyond the fight for power concerns
him much less. ' 22 9 Yeltsin has invested all of his policies and reforms
in himself rather than engaging in compromise and debate with parlia-
ment.230 He has not created a political party.231
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Yeltsin's popularity currently stands between two and three per-
cent. 32 It is hard to believe that there could be anywhere to go but
up. One can only hope that Yeltsin's successor will not have the habit
of changing prime ministers like changing socks. One wonders if the
unknown could be worse than the familiar. As one political analyst
put it, the political possibilities for Russia's future could make
America and, indeed, Russia, "nostalgic for a corrupt but friendly
drunk as a partner. 1133
The election in June, 2000 is up for grabs. The Russian Constitu-
tion as written and as implemented by Yeltsin has created an ex-
tremely weak parliament with power only to complain rather than
effect any real change. The Parliament has such a small role in gov-
ernment that political parties could not be developed to share the re-
sponsibility for government. Rule of law does not exist in Russia yet.
A good starting point may be to amend the constitution to limit the
power of the president.234 Although this would make a good begin-
ning, a more important task is to implement a democratic system and
a rule of law to encourage stability.235
Yeltsin's successor could easily act as dictator without any means
of reproach. Indeed, the Russian people are wearied from the con-
stant economic upheaval and insecurity.3 6 One committed to and
concerned about the democratic future of Russia can only hope that
the June 2000 election brings a new president more respectful of the
rule of law and separation of powers; a president willing to govern the
country consistently and effectively, within crisis and without.
Postscript
On December 31, 1999, in a surprise move, President Boris Yelt-
sin resigned from office, naming his then-current prime minister,
Vladimir Putin, as acting president. Presidential elections were
moved up to March, 2000, three months sooner than originally
planned. On March 26, Putin was elected president.
Yeltsin has been able to choose his successor, much like any auto-
crat would. Yeltsin continued to change his prime ministers until he
found a suitable successor and, once found, Yeltsin resigned less than
five months later. Yeltsin consistently used the powers vested to him
in the 1993 Russian Constitution, the constitution that he himself
drafted, to rule as an autocrat. He has met little resistance to his ac-
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tions. Now he has succeeded in hand-picking the next Russian
president.
The danger in all of this is that no one knows Vladimir Putin. He
appeared out of obscurity when appointed by Yeltsin in August, 1999
and only a short time has passed for Russia and the rest of the world
to see who he is and for what he stands. As the next president of
Russia, all we can do is hope that he will rule Russia according to the
rule of law in the constitution rather than act in his own interests,
using the constitution as a document granting him absolute power.
